Angelo Thio from Morciano di Leuca, the Aristotelian who explained the individual

Angelo Thio from Morciano di Leuca, the Aristotelian who explained the individual

His main work is entitled “The Object of Logic” and deals with topics such as the principle of the Individual according to the Aristotelian categories.

In this treatise the author from Morciano highlights the importance of analyzing not only the concept of universal, but also that of particular, underlining that the individual represents the essence of what is singular and unique.

It is stated that the individual is dual, comprising both substance and accident, and that it is predicated of only one specific entity, without extending to others. The individual is characterized by a composition of form and matter, where matter is defined in terms of quantity, quality, place, and time. These aspects are considered fundamental to individuation, making it clear that an individual must necessarily exist in order to be defined as such.

An interesting point raised is the error of Porphyry, who claims that the individual is predicated of only one thing. The author counters this claim, arguing that the individual, in fact, cannot be predicated of anything, but exists in and of itself. A distinction is presented between artificial and natural predicates, stating that the individual does not fall into any of these categories, and therefore cannot be the object of predication.

The examination extends to the analysis of the nature of the individual, highlighting that, although intelligences are singular, they do not have an indivisible existence, resulting in universals. The author argues that for something to be considered a predicate, it must be referred to something else, which implies that the individual, predicated only of itself, cannot be part of a proposition.

Reference is then made to a dispute with Averroes, in which the possibility of predicating the individual of the accident with respect to the object, contrary to the substance, is discussed. The author points out that Porphyry seems to contradict both Aristotle and Averroes, highlighting confusion regarding the predication of individuals.

Furthermore, the idea that the individual can be a non-natural predicate is criticized, reiterating the importance of maintaining the rigorous definition of predicate as something that must be referred to another entity. The words of Galen are recalled, according to which the terms must be natural to form valid propositions, and it is highlighted how the improper use of these definitions can lead to erroneous conclusions.

Finally, the author sets out to explain the cause of the individual, emphasizing that matter represents the main cause of individuation. It is shown that the individual differs based on matter rather than form, and that what is universal cannot be the cause of what is particular. Form, therefore, is seen as the cause of universality, while matter is the cause of particularity.